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Introduction
When Lakeith Smith was fifteen years old, he accompanied four of
his friends to burglarize a home in Millbrook, Alabama. 1 Smith’s friend
and accomplice in the burglary, sixteen-year-old A’Donte Washington,
engaged in a shootout with the police as the boys attempted to flee.2 A

1.

Jessica Lussenhop, In the US, You Don’t Have to Kill to Be a Murderer,
BBC News (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada43673331 [https://perma.cc/7D74-4LWF].

2.

Id.
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police officer shot and killed Washington. 3 Smith did not have a gun
and did not participate in the shootout; yet he was charged with felony
murder on the principle that intentionally acting as an accomplice in
the burglary implied an intent to kill his friend. 4 Smith turned down a
plea deal for twenty-five years in prison, expecting a lesser sentence at
the end of a jury trial because he did not have a gun, did not participate
in the act that caused Washington’s death, and did not intend to kill
his friend. 5 Instead, the jury sentenced Smith to thirty years in prison
for felony murder, fifteen years for burglary, and two ten-year sentences
for theft. 6 The chief assistant district attorney expressed his pleasure
with Smith’s severe sentence: “Because the sentences are consecutive,
it will be a long time before he comes up for even the possibility for
parole, at least 20 to 25 years.” 7 Andre Washington, the deceased teen’s
father, sat with Smith’s mother as a symbol of his rejection of the felony
murder rule’s application to Smith 8: “I went there to show him and his
family some support. What the officers did—it was totally wrong . . . .
I don’t feel [Smith] deserves that. No. Not at all.” 9
Smith was apparently unaware of the frequency with which juve–
niles in circumstances strikingly similar to his have been charged with
and convicted of felony murder. 10 In 1992, fourteen-year-old Timothy
Kane agreed to go along with a group of his friends to break in to a
neighbor’s house. 11 Kane hid in fear under the dining-room table as two
of his friends killed the home’s occupant. Kane received a life sentence

3.

Id.

4.

Portia Allen-Kyle, The Lakeith Smith Case Demonstrates the System’s
Brokenness, ACLU (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
smart-justice/lakeith-smith-case-demonstrates-systems-brokenness [https://
perma.cc/K8DJ-5CDP]; see also Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences
for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, Graham
& J.D.B., 11 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 297, 304–05 (2012).

5.

“The officer shot A’Donte, not Lakeith Smith . . . . Lakeith was a 15-yearold child, scared to death. He did not participate in the act that caused
the death of A’Donte. He never shot anybody.” Paula Rogo, Lakeith Smith
Was Sentenced to 65 Years for a Murder He Did Not Commit, Essence
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.essence.com/news/lakeith-smith-sentenced65-years/ [https://perma.cc/3A7U-68E9].

6.

Allen-Kyle, supra note 4.

7.

Rogo, supra note 5.

8.

Lussenhop, supra note 1.

9.

Rogo, supra note 5 (second alteration in original).

10.

See Lussenhop, supra note 1.

11.

Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 Future Children 15, 21 (2008).
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for felony murder. 12 In 1995, Curtis Brooks, a homeless teenager, agreed
to help a new acquaintance steal a car. 13 Brooks was given a gun and
his only role was to serve as a distraction by firing the gun into the air.
Brooks’s acquaintance unexpectedly shot the victim, and Brooks sub–
sequently received an automatic life sentence for felony murder. 14
Juveniles are frequently charged with felony murder, as their
immaturity makes them prone to engaging in dangerous crimes, like
robbery, that carry with them a risk of death. 15 The doctrine’s purposes
and rationales are fundamentally inconsistent with juveniles’ capacity
for reasoned decision-making, thus assigning juveniles an inappropriate
level of culpability. 16
This Note advocates for the exclusion of juveniles from the felony
murder rule in light of the fundamental “differentness” between juve–
niles and adults. The Supreme Court has recognized this differentness
by categorically excluding juveniles from certain severe types of
punishments and sentences—just as the Court has exempted other
categories of offenders from the death sentence, such as the mentally
disabled. 17 In light of the developing understanding of juveniles’ culp–
ability and behavior, and the acceptance that certain classes of citizens
should be excluded from capital punishment, states have created
“categorical” exceptions for juveniles in order to prevent excessive
punishment. “Romeo and Juliet” laws, for instance, protect juveniles
under many statutory rape and anti-child pornography laws that would
otherwise, if violated by an adult, impose severe sentences. 18 Those laws
are in line with the national standard of excluding juveniles from the
most severe sentences by accounting for an adolescent’s impulsive
behavior, their inability to evaluate consequences, and their suscep–
tibility to peer pressure. 19 That standard is further illustrated by states’
sentences that account for the offender’s age when deciding what

12.

Id.

13.

Katie Rose Quandt, A Killer Who Didn’t Kill, Slate (Sept. 18, 2018,
10:00 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/09/felony-murderrule-colorado-curtis-brooks.html [https://perma.cc/J2T2-K4LU].

14.

Id.

15.

See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 15, 21; Keller, supra note 4, at
315 (discussing, in the felony murder context, juveniles’ immaturity and
propensity for committing dangerous crimes).

16.

See Keller, supra note 4, at 309 (“[T]he rationale underlying felony murder
does not apply to juveniles and no penological goal justifies a life-withoutparole sentence when applied to juveniles.”).

17.

See infra notes 185–208 and accompanying text.

18.

See infra notes 209–238 and accompanying text.

19.

See infra Part II.A.
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punishment is appropriate. 20 The felony murder doctrine has been
limited and reconsidered in many states, indicating a new willingness
by courts and legislatures to re-evaluate the rule’s reach. Despite these
advances, the doctrine persists and, while it is potentially justified as
applied to adults, it should not be applied to juveniles in the same way
because it is fundamentally at odds with juveniles’ culpability. Indeed,
applying the doctrine to juveniles amounts to excessive, cruel, and
unusual punishment.
Part I of this Note outlines the felony murder doctrine and its
modern purposes and rationale. Part II explores juveniles’ capacity for
reasoned behavior in light of social science research and Supreme Court
jurisprudence that recognize the fundamental differentness between
adults and categorically less-culpable juveniles. Part III analyzes
juvenile felony murder in both the cruel-and-unusual and excessive-ordisproportionate punishment contexts. It addresses the Supreme
Court’s willingness to categorically exclude the less culpable from
certain sentences given states’ reconsiderations of the felony murder
doctrine and its application to juveniles. Part III also discusses state
laws exempting juveniles from severe sentences imposed on adults for
the same acts, as well as states’ practices of limiting and reevaluating
sentencing based on the perpetrator’s age. Part IV discusses excluding
juveniles from adult sentencing under the felony murder rule through a
standard that uses life-expectancy predictions to limit the length of
sentences courts may impose on juveniles.

I. Felony Murder Doctrine
The felony murder rule varies in its details under different statutory
schemes, but in its broadest form it provides that any killing is murder
when occurs during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony. 21 The felony murder rule transfers the intent to commit the
underlying felony to the intent to commit the homicide, 22 satisfying the
20.

See Jana L. Kern, Trends in Teen Sex Are Changing, but Are Minnesota’s
Romeo and Juliet Laws?, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1607, 1611–12 (2013)
(discussing “age-gap provisions” that account for age and limit
punishments accordingly).

21.

Charles E. Torcia, 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 147, at 295 (15th
ed. 1994), Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (“At common law, the
author of an unintended homicide is guilty of murder if the killing takes
place in the perpetration of a felony.”); id. § 147, at 301 (“Although a
given felon is not the actual killer, he is nevertheless responsible for the
homicide—and hence, murder—if his co-felon was the actual killer.”).

22.

Id. § 147, at 296–97 (stating that the requisite “malice is supplied by the
‘law’” and further noting that “[t]he malice which plays a part in the
commission of the felony is transferred by the law to the homicide”); see
also Keller, supra note 4, at 305.
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malice-aforethought requirement for murder. The intent to commit the
underlying felony thus establishes an “implied malice” 23 and eliminates
the prosecution’s need to otherwise prove any intent to cause the
resulting death, making it easier for the state to obtain convictions.24
This transferred intent is the outlier compared to the other mentalstate requirements for murder (including express intent to kill, intent
to cause serious bodily harm, and extreme reckless murder) because it
does not require any intent to cause a death. 25
Proponents of the felony murder rule argue that it is justified
because it deters potential offenders from committing dangerous
felonies out of fear of the severe punishment that would result should
someone die during that felony’s commission. 26 Consequently, the
deterrent effect forces offenders to perpetrate potentially violent crimes
more carefully or prevents offenders from engaging in violent crimes
altogether. 27 The second main justification for the felony murder rule is
retribution. A person convicted of felony murder, whether they were an
accomplice to the murder or the perpetrator of it, intended to commit
the underlying felony, which had the possibility of resulting in a death.28
A reasonable person perpetrating a dangerous felony would predict that
it might result in death. 29 Therefore, all perpetrators of the underlying
felony are morally blameworthy for any resulting death. 30
23.

Torcia, supra note 21, § 147, at 297 (explaining that “[a]s a result of the
fictional transfer [of malice from the underlying felony to the homicide],
the homicide is deemed committed with malice”); Keller, supra note 4, at
305 (“[T]he intent to commit the underlying felony constitutes ‘implied
malice.’”).

24.

Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 31.06(B)(5), at 519
(3d ed. 2001).

25.

See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 59, 64 (2004); Keller, supra note 4, at 312.

26.

See Alison Burton, Note, A Commonsense Conclusion: Creating a
Juvenile Carve Out of the Massachusetts Felony Murder Rule, 52 Harv.
C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 169, 172 (2017).

27.

See Hava Dayan, Femicide and the Law 54–55 (2018) (countering the
argument that the felony murder rule “reinforc[es] the notion of the
sanctity of human life” by noting that the rule’s ultimate deterrent effect
is unclear); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2005).

28.

Keller, supra note 4, at 312 (“The intent to kill element of [felony murder]
is inferred from an individual’s intent to commit the underlying felony
since a ‘reasonable person’ would know that death is a possible result of
felonious activities.”).

29.

Id.

30.

See Adam Liptak, Serving Life for Providing Car to Killers, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 4, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/us/04felony.html?ref
=topics [https://perma.cc/RY4G-8LMH] (noting that, in the opinion of
both the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation’s legal director and the local
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These rationales presuppose that an offender has the capacity to
foresee the potentially severe consequences of committing a felony,
namely that someone may be killed in its commission. 31 Justice Breyer,
recognizing that the rationale of the felony-murder doctrine is based on
that assumption, stressed that “the ability to consider the full conseq–
uences of a course of action and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly is
precisely what we know juveniles lack capacity to do effectively.”32
Another retributive rationale is that the rule brings justice to the
victims’ families and creates a mechanism by which those who
knowingly engage in violent and dangerous felonies are punished accor–
dingly. 33 These purposes cannot be served by a rule that assumes
reasoned decision-making because juveniles are generally incapable of
precisely that type of decision-making. And so, attaching blame to
inherently less culpable juveniles frustrates the rule’s retributive
purpose. 34

II. Juveniles as Fundamentally Different from Adults
The felony murder rule allows the intent to kill to be inferred from
the intent to commit an underlying felony. 35 The rule presumes that
the offender can foresee the consequences of perpetuating a felony, even
if they did not actually foresee a death or intend to kill anyone. 36 This
presumption is fundamentally inconsistent with juveniles’ behavior and
lack of capacity for such reasoned decision-making. 37 As the Supreme
prosecutor of a felony murder case, the rule “serves important inter–
ests . . . because it holds all persons responsible for the actions of each
other if they are all participating in the same crime”); see also David
Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine,
8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 359, 363 (1985) (asserting that “the felony
murder doctrine reflects the conclusion that a robbery that causes death
is more closely akin to murder than to robbery”).
31.

Keller, supra note 4, at 312.

32.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 492 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).

33.

See John Diaz, Rewrite of Felony Murder Rule Exchanges One Injustice for
Another, S.F. Chron. (Sept. 22, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.
com/opinion/diaz/article/Rewrite-of-felony-murder-rule-exchanges-one13249023.php [https://perma.cc/2G39-KTUD] (discussing a victim’s family’s
fear that eliminating the felony murder doctrine would prevent the
offender from being adequately punished).

34.

See Keller, supra note 4, at 305–06.

35.

See supra notes 22–23, 28–29 and accompanying text.

36.

See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.

37.

See Keller, supra note 4, at 312 (noting that it is illogical to presume a
juvenile is capable of understanding that death may be a consequence of
a felony).
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Court has repeatedly observed, “juveniles cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders”; 38 they are less culpable than
adults due to “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility . . . often result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.” 39 Additionally, “juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences . . . including peer pressure . . . [and]
the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”40
Social and behavioral science research shows that juveniles are not
completely developed, rendering them less capable than adults of either
effectively evaluating their actions’ consequences or allowing those
evaluations to curb their impulsive tendencies. 41 The felony murder
rule’s penological purposes are not achieved through its imposition on
juveniles because juveniles are continually developing, a reality evident
in the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing that juveniles have less–
ened culpability as compared to adults. 42 Consequently, applying the
felony murder rule to juveniles is fundamentally at odds with Supreme
Court precedent, as well as various punishment theories, and the
doctrine’s overall purpose.
A. Social Sciences’ Recognition of Juveniles’ Immaturity and Limited
Capacity for Reasoned Decision-Making

Adolescents undergo a period of transitional and formative develop–
ment as they move from childhood into young adulthood. 43 This period
includes biological, cognitive, and psychosocial growth, in addition to
shifting social relationships in school, among peers, and with family
members. 44 This developmental period has major implications for the
38.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).

39.

Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
367 (1993)).

40.

Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 72 (2010) (noting that “the same characteristics that render juveniles
less culpable than adults suggest . . that juveniles will be less susceptible
to deterrence. Because juveniles’ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility . . . often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S.
at 571; Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471
(2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (identifying
the differences that result from children’s “diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform”) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471).

41.

See infra Part II.A.

42.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.

43.

Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile
Justice 32 (2008).

44.

Id.
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adolescent’s future and success as an adult as it forms an adolescent’s
perception of society and shapes their identity. 45 Society and the law
recognize that juveniles are both less mature and less responsible than
adults, “often lack[ing] the experience, perspective, and judgment exp–
ected of adults.” 46 Cognitive development involves the ability to
understand information, engage in analysis, and reason one’s way to an
informed decision. 47 Psychosocial growth extends beyond cognitive
development, encompassing an adolescent’s decision-making process in
light of social and emotional determinants. 48
Anatomically, the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with
rational decision-making and behavior regulation, is immature and
underdeveloped in juveniles’ brains. 49 The prefrontal cortex is not fully
formed until one’s mid-twenties. 50 This part of the brain affects a
person’s ability to control their behavior, including their impulsivity
and consequence assessment. 51 Therefore, the underdevelopment and
immaturity of the prefrontal cortex, consistent in all adolescents, limits
their “ability to judge and evaluate future consequences” and strongly
45.

Id.; see also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of
Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than
Adults, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 741, 741–42 (2000) (noting that the juvenile
criminal justice system is separate from the adult system due to beliefs
that adolescents are “less capable of mature judgment than adults and
are therefore less culpable for any offenses that they commit; and . . . that
they are more amenable to treatment than adults, and therefore are more
likely to profit from rehabilitation”).

46.

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)).

47.

Michael Barbee, Comment, Juveniles Are Different: Juvenile Life Without
Parole after Graham v. Florida, 81 Miss. L.J. 299, 314 (2011).

48.

Id.; Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 45 at 742–43 (addressing juveniles’
cognitive and psychosocial development and describing psychosocial
immaturity in juveniles as “deficiencies in adolescents’ social and
emotional capability”).

49.

Barbee, supra note 47, at 317–18; B.J. Casey et al., Structural and
Functional Brain Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development,
54 Biological Psychol. 241, 245 (2000) (discussing the prefrontal
cortex and stating that “behavioral regulation [is] used to describe
inhibitory processes in cognitive and social development”); Julie Vidal et
al., Response Inhibition in Adults and Teenagers: Spatiotemporal
Differences in the Prefrontal Cortex, 79 Brain & Cognition 49, 49–50
(2012).

50.

Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in
Juvenile Justice, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 89, 152 & n.252 (listing several
social science sources that address prefrontal cortex development).

51.

See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role
of Brain Science in Protecting Adolescents, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 447,
458–59 (2014).
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correlates with their exhibited behaviors. 52 Even when juveniles exhibit
the same cognitive ability as adults to understand information relevant
to making a decision, and if they are able to identify the associated
risks and rewards, juveniles’ judgment is still limited by their incom–
plete psychosocial development. 53 Although cognitively able to under–
stand information and reason, juveniles lack the same capacity as adults
to thoughtfully evaluate risks and foreseeable consequences when trying
to make an informed decision. 54 This diminished decision-making
capacity is marked by juveniles’ immaturity in complex processes such
as susceptibility to influence, underdeveloped risk-assessment skills and
perspective, and lack of restraint and impulse control. 55
As juveniles undergo psychosocial maturation and formative
development, they are easily influenced by their social environments
and their fellow adolescents, leading them to engage in risky behavior.56
In assessing the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on
juveniles under the age of sixteen, the Supreme Court reasoned that
“[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make [a] teenager
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion

52.

Id. at 459–60 (quoting Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 17, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 087621)).

53.

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 43, at 36–37; Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1012 (2003).

54.

Steinberg & Scott, supra note 53.

55.

Id. (identifying the processes “most relevant to understanding differences
in judgment and decision making”); Barbee, supra note 47, at 314 (noting
the psychosocial factors that influence decision-making and judgment
include peer influence, risk assessment, future orientation, and impulse
control). Elizabeth Cauffman and her colleagues reasoned that the
processes that constitute psychosocial maturity and influence adolescents’
decision-making include responsibility, which involves susceptibility to
peer pressure; perspective, which involves considering individual actions
within a broader context; and temperance, which involves suppressing
impulsive behavior. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., How Developmental
Science Influences Juvenile Justice Reform, 8 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 21,
23 (2018). Cauffman identifies a psychosocial immaturity gap between
juveniles and adults resulting from developmental differences in “how
much [juveniles] consider the consequences of their actions, how sensitive
they are to rewards, how susceptible they are to peer influence, and how
much they are able to regulate impulsive behavior.” Id.

56.

See Cauffman et al., supra note 55, at 24; see also Keller, supra note 4,
at 313–14.
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or peer pressure than is an adult.” 57 Before maturing and developing an
independent sense of self, juveniles seek peer approval and are less
capable of resisting peer influence, often for fear of social rejection or in
the pursuit of heightened social status. 58 Juveniles do not have a fully
formed character, instead possessing “transitory” personality traits59
that render them susceptible to immature and irresponsible behavior as
a result of their “vulnerability” to negative outside influences. 60 Eng–
aging in criminal or otherwise risky activities may earn juveniles the
immediate rewards of an elevated social standing and approval among
friends. 61 Accordingly, juveniles’ susceptibility to peer influence greatly
enhances the likelihood that they will partake in dangerous felonies that
are potentially subject to the felony murder rule. 62
Juveniles are not likely to resist the pressure to engage in a crime
with a group because they are easily influenced by groups and they do
not want to be rejected as the odd one out. 63 Timothy Kane, for
example, was fourteen years old when he accompanied his friends to
rob a neighbor’s home and two of his accomplices killed the home’s
residents. 64 Kane sought his peers’ approval when he participated in the
felony, stating that he did not want to remain behind and be deemed a
“fraidy-cat.” 65
Juveniles are also subject to pressures and negative influences from
parental and authority figures. 66 Sixteen-year-old Kevin Buford attem–
57.

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion).

58.

Keller, supra note 4, at 314; see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at
20.

59.

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 19, 24.

60.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).

61.

Keller, supra note 4, at 314; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 53, at 1014 (“For most teens, [risky or
antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual
identity becomes settled.”)).

62.

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 20–21 (“[A]dolescents might make
choices in response to direct peer pressure, as when they are coerced to
take risks that they might otherwise avoid. . . . Teens appear to seek peer
approval especially in group situations. Thus, perhaps it is not surprising
that young offenders are far more likely than adults to commit crimes in
groups.”).

63.

Id. at 21.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (noting that juveniles
“‘are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures,’
including from their family”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569 (2005)).
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pted to reconnect with his estranged criminal father when, at his
father’s encouragement, he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana for the
first time. 67 Kevin’s father and his uncle gave Kevin a gun, told him to
rob a man walking by, and directed him to shoot the man when the
man fought back. 68 Kevin was convicted of felony murder and received
a life sentence; his uncle and father each received only twenty years.69
Juveniles’ vulnerability, according to the Supreme Court, “mean[s]
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment.” 70
Compared to adults, juveniles are less inclined to consider the longterm consequences of their actions when deciding whether to engage in
risky and antisocial behavior. 71 Juveniles exhibit a “propensity towards
immediate rewards” that leaves them less able to consider either their
actions and the implications of those actions within a broader, futureoriented scheme. 72 Juveniles’ failures to assess future risks often leads
them to focus on immediate rewards rather than engaging in adequate
planning. 73 In addition, juveniles lack the experience and accompanying
knowledge that adults have gained over time. 74 They often fail to foresee
a reasonable outcome and instead view the consequences of a predic–
table outcome as surprising or “accidental.” 75 Juveniles may also

67.

Anita Wadhwani & Adam Tamburin, Special Report: In Tennessee, 185
People are Serving Life for Crimes Committed as Teens, Tennessean
(Mar. 6, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/03/
07/juvenile-sentencing-tennessee-cyntoia-brown-clemency-life/2848278002/
?utm_source=oembed&utm_medium=news&utm_campaign=storylines
[https://perma.cc/GD2F-HLPL].

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.

71.

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 20; Keller, supra note 4, at 313.

72.

See Burton, supra note 26, at 185 (noting that adolescents’ “lack of future
orientation dovetails with the high rate of reward bias in adolescents to
create the perfect storm for accidental crimes like felony murder”).

73.

Id. at 184; Keller, supra note 4, at 313.

74.

See Charles Garabedian, Juvenile Empiricism: Approaches to Juvenile
Sentencing in Light of Graham and Miller, 21 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. &
Pol’y 195, 204 (2017) (noting the differences in life experiences between
juveniles and adults and juveniles’ failure to appreciate consequences in
the future due to their lack of worldliness).

75.

Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A
Study of 17 Cases, 15 Crim. Just. 26, 28 (2000); see also Erin H. Flynn,
Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence
and Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1049, 1055
(2008) (observing that juveniles’ immaturity leads them to fail to foresee
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overvalue an action’s potential reward because they are unable to fully
appreciate that action’s identifiable risks. 76 Their limited ability to
assess their actions’ consequences and risks makes juveniles prone to
acting impulsively, compounding their already limited capacity for selfregulation. 77 Their failure to adequately assess consequences makes
juveniles likely to engage in dangerous felonies when the expected
benefits—gaining status, 78 stealing money or goods, or simply feeling a
thrill—outweigh a seemingly unlikely or unconsidered death. 79
Consequently, juveniles are not the reasonable persons that the felony
murder rule assumes can competently foresee death as a result of their
dangerous actions.
Neither the felony murder rule itself nor its rationales account for
juveniles’ lack of capacity for reasoned decision-making; they do not
account for the fact that juveniles are in a state of cognitive and
psychosocial development during which their maturity and ability to
evaluate risks and make rational, reasoned decisions is limited. 80
B. Juveniles and the Penological Purposes of the Felony Murder Rule

In the criminal justice system, punishment serves four purposes:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 81 The
system’s goal is that an offender’s sentence is proportional to the offense
they committed; that punishment “be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant.” 82 The felony murder doctrine
seeks to punish offenders according to their level of blameworthiness for
the underlying felony that led to the murder. 83 In Graham v. Florida,

the consequences of their actions and thus less likely to be deterred by
punishment).
76.

See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 22.

77.

Id.

78.

Keller, supra note 4, at 314.

79.

See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that a juvenile might
not decline to participate in a robbery because “the ‘adventure’ of the
holdup and the possibility of getting some money are exciting”).

80.

Barbee, supra note 47, at 314; Beyer, supra note 75, at 27 (“[S]cientific
evidence now supports the contention that the juvenile brain is often
incapable of adult reasoning because of its long maturation process.”).

81.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010); 1 Charles E. Torcia,
Wharton’s Criminal Law § 1, at 2 (15th ed. 1993), Westlaw (database
updated Sept. 2019).

82.

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

83.

See Martin Gardner, Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right
to Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83 Tenn.
L. Rev. 455, 464 (2016); see also Richard Wasserstrom, Some Problems
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the Supreme Court noted that courts may impose severe punishments
on juvenile non-homicide offenders in order to condemn the crime and
serve justice, but “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender.” 84 That retributive purpose is not served by
applying the felony murder rule to juveniles because juvenile nonhomicide offenders do not have a culpable mental state regarding any
death that results from their felonies. 85 Juveniles only have a culpable
mental state regarding the underlying felony because they only have
the capacity to evaluate the crime at hand and its immediate rewards,
not the violent consequences that may be foreseeable to an adult
perpetrating the same crime.
Deterrence seeks to prevent crime by steering the general
population away from crime and by specifically dissuading prior
criminals from reoffending. 86 The Supreme Court, social scientists, and
others have argued that deterrence has less of an effect on juveniles
than it does on adults. 87 Recently, scholars have argued that the
Supreme Court’s reliance on juveniles’ immaturity and the Court’s
“recognition of youth’s susceptibility to peer pressure and lack of
impulse control, raise[s] serious questions regarding the justification of
the use of the felony murder rule as a deterrence mechanism for young
people.” 88 That is, the possible imposition of the felony murder rule does
not effectively deter juveniles from engaging in either dangerous felonies
or other activities that create the risk of violence and death. 89 Whether
with Theories of Punishment, in Justice and Punishment 173, 179
(J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977).
84.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (alteration in original) (quoting Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).

85.

See R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, 645–47 (Can.); see also Liptak,
supra note 30 (stating that the Canadian Supreme Court eliminated
accessorial felony murder liability because such punishment counters “the
principle that punishment must be proportionate to the moral
blameworthiness of the offender”).

86.

Torcia, supra note 81, § 3, at 16.

87.

Shobha L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and
the New Juvenile Jurisprudence, Champion, Mar. 2014, at 14, 16.

88.

Id.

89.

The Supreme Court stated that the characteristics that make juveniles
less culpable than adults prove that deterrence will not work on juveniles.
Juveniles’ immaturity and irresponsibility leads to impulsive actions, so
juveniles are not likely to “take a possible punishment into consideration
when making decisions.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. “[I]n light of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral responsibility, any limited
deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not enough to justify
the sentence.” Id.

153

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Considering a Juvenile Exception to the Felony Murder Rule

they are the principal actors or mere accomplices, 90 juveniles are less
likely than adults to engage in a reasoned analysis before committing a
felony. 91 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 92 the Court reasoned that juveniles
do not engage in an effective cost-benefit analysis through which they
might recognize the potential severity of consequences for their actions;
without such an analysis, there is no deterrence. 93 Juveniles give little
weight to the fact that others their age have been severely punished for
the same or similar actions. 94 Instead, juveniles often engage in “thrillseek[ing]” behavior, viewing themselves as immune from the conseq–
uences suffered by others for the same behavior. 95
Rehabilitation involves reshaping an offender’s character and
actions so that they are no longer disposed to crime. 96 Juveniles are
likely to respond positively to rehabilitation because their characters
are in a developmental state and they are susceptible to influence, which
creates the capacity for growth and change. 97 When juveniles convicted
of felony murder are questioned about their decision to engage in a
dangerous felony, they often state that they did not know what they
were thinking or that they were completely different people when they
committed the crime than they are now. 98 Although juveniles are
generally amenable to rehabilitation, 99 conviction under the felony
90.

Id.

91.

Flynn, supra note 75, at 1062, 1070.

92.

487 U.S. 815 (1988).

93.

Id. at 836–38 (“The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the
kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”).

94.

See id. at 838; see also Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice:
Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty 14 (2001) (“A child or
adolescent generally does not possess the level of moral responsibility and
culpability that society expects of an adult. Juveniles are particularly
unlikely to be deterred by the specter of punishment.”).

95.

Beyer, supra note 75, at 27.

96.

Torcia, supra note 81, § 4, at 18.

97.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (recognizing that
juveniles are susceptible to influence and that their character traits are
transitory); see also Brief of the Constitution Projects as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)
(noting that teenagers’ immaturity is balanced by their ability to grow,
and that “[t]o the relief of all, most eventually emerge from the trying
years of adolescence with the ability to function in society as responsible
adults”); Flynn, supra note 75, at 1055 (“The implication of . . . the
transitory nature of juvenile character traits, is that children and
adolescents have a greater propensity for rehabilitation than adults.”).

98.

See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 19–23.

99.

See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 742.

154

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Considering a Juvenile Exception to the Felony Murder Rule

murder rule does not afford them the opportunity to rehabilitate in an
appropriate setting, and therefore the rule does not serve this
penological goal. 100
Incapacitation as a penological goal seeks to render a person
incapable of reoffending or committing a crime. 101 The most common
form of incapacitation is incarceration. 102 Incarceration limits the value
a juvenile’s life may have to society by isolating the adolescent and
inhibiting their growth, thus it does not serve a utilitarian purpose.103
Proponents of incapacitation suggest that a juvenile offender still has
the opportunity to develop and rehabilitate while they are incarcerated
or otherwise incapacitated. 104 Given their malleability and receptiveness
to influence (positive or negative), juveniles are best reformed in a
rehabilitative and educational-treatment setting rather than prison’s
restrictive environment as juveniles in prison may be exposed to severe
violence, sexual assault, and other negative influences. 105
C. Supreme Court Precedent Recognizing the Fundamental Differentness
of Juveniles and Restricting Severe Juvenile Sentencing

The Supreme Court recognizes that juveniles are fundamentally
different from adults and understands that neither the felony murder
rule’s penological purposes nor its rationales are served through its
application to juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court recognized
that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults—and generally
less culpable—leading it to hold that juveniles convicted of capital
offenses cannot be sentenced to death. 106 Prior to this decision, the
Supreme Court had upheld the capital punishment of sixteen- and
seventeen-year olds. 107 But shifts in societal attitudes and advances in
the understanding of juveniles’ behavior and development led the Court
100. See Keller, supra note 4, at 316.
101. Alana Barton, Incapacitation Theory, in Encyclopedia of Prisons &
Correctional Facilities 463 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005).
102. Id.
103. Torcia, supra note 81, § 4, at 20 (“If the climate in prison is hostile,
inordinately repressive, and primarily punishment-oriented, reformative
efforts will probably not succeed.”).
104. Id.
105. See Cynthia L. Schirmer, Punishing Children as Adults: On Meeting
International Standards and U.S. Ratification of the U.N Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 16 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 715, 737–39 (2008)
(discussing the harms caused by housing juveniles in the same prisons as
adults, including increased anger and rates of recidivism, sexual assault,
and a lack of positive influence).
106. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69.
107. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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to reject its previous decision. 108 In Roper, the defendant, Simmons, was
seventeen years old when he and his friends planned to “find someone
to burglarize, tie the victim up and ultimately push the victim off a
bridge.” 109 Simmons and two others broke into the home of their victim,
Shirley Crook, whom Simmons recognized. 110 Because he recognized
Crook, Simmons led his friends in tying her up, putting her in the back
of her car, and driving her to a railroad trestle. 111 After finding that
Crook had escaped some of her restraints, Simmons used a towel, a
purse strap, and an electrical wire to hog-tie Crook, and then threw
her, while she was conscious, off the trestle into a river. 112 Simmons
later bragged about the murder, and confessed to it after two hours of
questioning. 113 Simmons not only planned to kill his victim, but handled
her with cruelty, and subjected her to a tortuous death, and later
displayed extreme callousness concerning his actions and Crook’s
death. 114
Despite the shocking nature of Simmons’s behavior, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles, 115 explaining that the “death penalty is
reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders” 116 and that
Simmons did not fall within that narrow category. The Court
recognized that juveniles are not those “most deserving of execution”117
because they lack maturity and responsibility (resulting in impulsive
behavior), they are vulnerable to influence, and they have a transient,
undeveloped character. 118 These traits render capital murderers who are
juveniles: (1) less blameworthy than adults convicted of the same crime,
(2) less likely than adults to be deterred by the threat of a death
sentence, and (3) unlikely to be deemed “irretrievably depraved,” even
108. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
109. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997).
110. Id. at 170.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 169–70.
113. Id. at 170.
114. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556–57.
115. Id. at 568.
116. Id. at 568–69.
117. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
118. Id. at 569–70; see also id. at 598 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing to
the Court’s recognition that juveniles “lack maturity and responsibility
and are more reckless than adults[,] . . . are more vulnerable to outside
influences because they have less control over their surroundings[,] . . .
and . . . [their] character is not as fully formed as that of an adult”).
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after committing “the most heinous of crimes.” 119 The Court cited
previous decisions in which it considered whether the Eighth Amend–
ment mandated that certain offenders should be categorically exempted
from the death penalty. 120 The Court then examined thirty states’ bans
on death-penalty sentences for juveniles and noted that even those
states that did not ban such sentences imposed them infrequently. 121
The Supreme Court cited these as “objective indicia” 122 that the nation
generally found juveniles undeserving of the death penalty. 123
The Supreme Court’s recognition in Roper of juveniles’ insufficient
culpability and the marked, well-understood differences between
juveniles and adults supports the notion that applying the felony
murder rule to juveniles does not serve the rule’s intended purpose.
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida 124 again limited
the imposition of severe sentences on juveniles. Terrence Graham came
from a difficult home and engaged in crime at an early age. 125 At sixteen
years old, Graham and two friends broke into a home and robbed the
inhabitants at gunpoint. 126 Graham had been arrested before, and so,
in light of his failure to refrain from committing another crime, he was
sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for the
armed robbery, and another fifteen-year sentence for an additional
attempted armed robbery. 127
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.
Graham emphasized the fundamental differentness of juveniles and
reflected the Court’s willingness to afford juveniles a categorical
exclusion from harsh adult sentences like those imposed by the felony
murder rule. 128 The Court reasoned that defendants who do not intend
119. Id. at 598–99 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 573 (majority
opinion) (noting the difficulty in distinguishing a juvenile acting in a state
of “transient immaturity” from the rare, “irreparabl[y]” corrupt juvenile
offender).
120. See id. at 561–63 (majority opinion) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 838 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321).
121. Roper, 542 U.S. at 552.
122. Id. at 564 (considering objective evidence of societal standards in addition
to the Court’s own understanding of the evolving standards of decency).
123. Id.; see also Burton, supra note 26, at 178.
124. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
125. Id. at 53.
126. Id. at 54.
127. Id. at 56–57.
128. See Keller, supra note 4, at 308 (“Graham recognized that, in the Eighth
Amendment context, while ‘death is different,’ ‘kids are different,’ too,
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to kill “or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving
of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.” 129 The
Court noted first that it was rare for states to impose life-withoutparole-sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenses. And second that it
was not dispositive that many states did not actively prohibit such
sentences because those states also did not expressly conclude that
those sentences would be appropriate. 130 The Court discussed
accessorial felony murder, noting that:
Although an offense like robbery or rape is “a serious crime
deserving serious punishment,” those crimes differ from homicide
crimes in a moral sense. It follows that, when compared to an
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to
kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. 131

In 2012, the Supreme Court once more reinforced its views that
juveniles are fundamentally different from adults, categorically less
culpable than adults, and deserving of special treatment in sentencing.
In Miller v. Alabama, 132 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile homicide offenders. 133 Miller involved two consolidated cases in
which fourteen-year-old boys were convicted of murder. 134 In the first
case, Kuntrell Jackson was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder
when he and his friends robbed a video store and one of his accomplices
killed the store clerk. 135 Evan Miller received life in prison when he
and they are entitled to a separate categorical analysis when severe adult
sentences are applied to them.”) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 103
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
129. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.
130. Id. at 64–66.
131. Id. at 69 (citation omitted) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 781,
797 (1982)).
132. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
133. Id. at 470. In Miller, the Supreme Court considered two lines of cases
regarding disproportionate sentencing: one that “adopted categorical bans
on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a
class of offenders and the severity of a penalty”; the other that led the
Court to prohibit the “mandatory imposition of capital punishment” and
to require that sentencing authorities consider the offender’s unique
characteristics. Id. In combination, these two lines of cases led the Miller
Court to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory juvenile
life-without-parole sentences in part because juveniles are categorically
less culpable than adult offenders. Id. at 471.
134. Id. at 465.
135. Id. at 465–66.
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caused his neighbor’s death by drunkenly beating the man with a
baseball bat and subsequently setting the man’s trailer on fire. 136 The
Court reasoned that Roper and Graham led to the conclusion that
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violates the
Eighth Amendment. 137 Again, the Court asserted that one’s youth
diminishes their culpability and must be considered in sentencing. 138

III. The Application of the Felony Murder Rule to
Juveniles and the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition on
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, asserts that “excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish–
ments inflicted.” 139 The Supreme Court has examined many lengthy and
severe sentences for whether they violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.
In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
forbids courts from sentencing juveniles to death. 140 The Court utilized
a proportionality framework to determine whether a punishment is so
disproportionate or excessive that it is cruel and unusual. 141 This
framework does not necessitate a “static” interpretation of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend–
ment, 142 rather it requires that courts assess the “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 143 The Supreme
Court recognized that “a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider
136. Id. at 467–69.
137. Id. at 470.
138. Id. at 471. In 2016, the Supreme Court again examined juvenile sentencing
and held that Miller created a substantive constitutional rule that applies
retroactively in state collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718 (2016). In Montgomery, the Court held that “[a]llowing those
offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes
reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will
not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 736.
139. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
141. Id. at 560; see also id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (discussing the Court’s continued use
of a “proportionality” precept in determining whether the punishment for
a crime is properly tailored to the offense).
142. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976) (“It is clear . . . that the
Eighth Amendment has not been regarded as a static concept.”).
143. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 100, 101 (1958)).
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application than the mischief which gave it birth”. 144 Consequently, the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments “is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” 145 The applicable standards
of decency are those that “currently prevail,” not the standards that
were in place at the time a statute or rule was created or, in the Eighth
Amendment’s case, at the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 146 Determining
what the currently prevailing standards are involves assessing objective
indicia that reflect national norms, including the states’ legislative
judgments and sentencing juries’ behaviors. 147
The Court’s analysis also evaluates whether a particular punish–
ment contributes to legitimate penological goals. 148 In doing so, the
Supreme Court considers whether the punishment is subjectively
excessive. 149 In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court sustained the imposition of
the death sentence for armed robbery and murder. 150 But, it affirmed
that the “Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are
‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime
committed.” 151 The Court described a two-part analysis for determining
whether a punishment is excessive. First, “a punishment is ‘excessive’
and unconstitutional if it . . . makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” 152 Second, a
punishment is excessive if it is “grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime.” 153 The Court highlighted that a small number of sentences
144. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910)).
145. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
146. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
147. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg,
428 U.S. at 181.
148. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (applying this Eighth
Amendment–proportionality analysis to invalidate the death penalty for
persons who commit felony murder without actually killing or having
intent to kill).
149. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
150. 428 U.S. at 186, 206–07.
151. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (summarizing Gregg’s holding).
152. Id.
153. Id. In Gregg, under this prong of the analysis, the Supreme Court
specifically considered the death penalty and compared it “to other
sentences imposed for similar crimes.” 428 U.S. at 203. The Court also
noted that the lower court in Georgia considered both the type of crime
and the defendant’s particular circumstances in analyzing the imposition
of the death sentence. Id. at 204.
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imposing less-severe-than-normal punishments does not necessarily
prove that the standard punishment is arbitrary or disproportionate.154
The requirements that a punishment be not excessive and in proportion
to the crime’s severity requires that only culpable offenders are
punished. 155
A. Objective Evidence that Evolving Standards of Decency Are Moving
Courts Away from Applying the Felony Murder Rule to Juveniles

Current legislation provides objective evidence of contemporary
national values. 156 So states’ collective legislative action is a clear
indicator of an evolving national standard of decency. 157 To date, no
state has categorically excluded juveniles from convictions under the
felony murder rule. 158 Nevertheless, states have consistently exhibited a
trend toward treating juveniles as less developed, less responsible, and
less mature than adults, indicating a recognition of juveniles’ reduced
culpability. As the Supreme Court put it in Thompson v. Oklahoma,159
“[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct
is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” 160 Age limitations
on voting, marriage, smoking, military service, buying tickets to Rrated movies, acquiring birth control, drinking, driving, gambling,
acquiring piercings and tattoos, purchasing firearms, finding
employment, and renting a car all demonstrate a general societal
154. The Gregg Court noted that a single incident of a jury deciding against
the death penalty did “not render unconstitutional death sentences
imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not
create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.” 428 U.S. at 203.
155. Guyora Binder et al., Capital Punishment of Unintentional Felony Murder,
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1141, 1152–56 (2017).
156. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
157. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
158. See State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 197 (Iowa 2018). There, the court
noted that “there is not a national consensus against sentencing juvenile
offenders convicted of felony murder as the principal or accomplice to life
imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility.” Id. Additionally, no
state “has categorically held that life with the possibility of parole should
be categorically prohibited for juveniles convicted of felony murder.” Id.
And recognizing that although there might be a specific situation in which
the application of the felony murder rule to a certain juvenile offender
would be unconstitutional, the Harrison court declined to hold that “the
felony-murder rule is fundamentally unfair or that it violates due process
under the Iowa or United States Constitutions when applied to juvenile
offenders pursuant to a theory of aiding and abetting.” Id. at 196.
159. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 835.
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recognition of juveniles’ limited maturity and lack of capacity for
certain rational choices. 161
There has been a national shift towards limiting the severity of the
felony murder rule. Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Massachusetts, and
Ohio are among the states that have eliminated the felony murder rule
entirely. 162 Although other states have not banned the felony murder
rule’s application to juveniles, 163 some have begun limiting its appli–
cation to them. 164 The Colorado General Assembly implemented a
resentencing scheme for juveniles who were unconstitutionally senten–
ced prior to Miller, including a limit on the sentence those convicted of
felony murder could receive. 165 In 2014, Florida passed legislation
161. See Preston & Crowther, supra note 51, at 451–52 (detailing protection
for minors through age-based restrictions); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005) (noting that the defense counsel reminded the
jury that “juveniles of Simmons’ [sic] age cannot drink, serve on juries, or
even see certain movies, because ‘the legislatures have wisely decided that
individuals of a certain age aren’t responsible enough’”); Nick Straley,
Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for
Children, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 963, 989 (2014) (recognizing societal
limitations on juvenile activities including smoking, drinking, voting, and
increased charges for car renters under twenty-five years old).
162. See Jason Tashea, California Considering End to Felony Murder Rule,
ABA Journal (July 5, 2018, 11:27 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/california_considering_end_to_felony_murder_rule [https://
perma.cc/3VU7-ZWFX].
163. See Harrison, 914 N.W.2d at 197–99, 202.
164. But see People v. Richardson, No. A134783, 2013 WL 2432510, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 4, 2013). The California court considered excluding juvenile
offenders from the felony murder rule on constitutional grounds. Id. at
*6–8. Richardson participated in an armed robbery when he was sixteen
years old during which the robbery victim was killed. Id. at *1. He was
convicted of felony murder, and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.
Id. In his 2012 appeal, the court reasoned that Richardson’s sentence was
not cruel and unusual because he was not sentenced to the state’s most
severe penalty of life without parole or its functional equivalent. Id. at
*6–7. The felony-murder doctrine is set by statute, and many state
statutes do not allow for discretionary sentencing but instead require a
minimum mandatory sentence based on strict liability. Id. at *4.
Sentencing under the felony-murder rule, however, is necessarily severe
for juveniles. This sentence is particularly extreme in light of the
offender’s culpability in the death because juvenile offenders cannot
adequately appreciate the risk of a death in committing a felony, as adults
committing the same crime would be.
165. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-2-906–907 (2017); see also Beth McCann,
Resentencing Juveniles Put Behind Bars for Life with Care and Discretion,
Denver Post (Sept. 20, 2018, 7:41 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/
2018/09/20/resentencing-juveniles-put-behind-bars-for-life-with-careand-discretion/ [https://perma.cc/5VE7-99NW] (describing the Colorado
juvenile resentencing options for those convicted of felony murder: “the
court may sentence the juvenile to a 30 to 50 year sentence with 10 years
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altering its juvenile-sentencing scheme and automatically entitling a
juvenile convicted of a capital felony, but who did not actually kill,
intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim, to a review of their sentence
if the sentence was a prison term of greater than fifteen years. 166 North
Carolina adopted a revised sentencing scheme regarding the felony
murder rule’s application to juvenile offenders. 167 Its resentencing
structure granted offenders resentencing hearings and it then limited
the length of time for which an offender who was a juvenile at the time
of the offense may serve. 168 California enacted a bill that raised the
state’s minimum age to sixteen years old for juveniles who may be
transferred to adult court, even if they were charged with murder or
other serious offenses. 169 Previously, the district attorney could move to
transfer fourteen- and fifteen-year-old juveniles to adult court for
certain serious offenses. 170 The new law reflects California’s recognition
of juveniles’ differentness.
Objective evidence of a “social and professional consensus” 171 that
a form of punishment is cruel and unusual may include trends and views
from outside the United States. 172 Justice Kennedy wrote, “the opinion
of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own concl–
of mandatory parole if the court finds extraordinary mitigating
circumstances”); People v. Brooks, 426 P.3d 353 (Colo. 2018).
166. Fla. Stat. § 775.082(b)(2) (2014).
167. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B (2012); see also State v. Jefferson, 798
S.E.2d 121, 122–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding the constitutionality
of a mandatory life sentence with the possibility for parole after twentyfive years for a juvenile convicted of felony murder).
168. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B (2012).
169. 2018 Cal. Stat. 95.
170. See id.
171. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
172. See id. at 316–17 n.21 (discussing the support of the national consensus
against the execution of the mentally disabled by a broader social and
professional consensus including within the world community where “the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”); see also Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (finding that executing a sixteenyear-old would offend civilized standards of decency is “consistent with
the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizat–
ions, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by
the leading members of the Western European community”); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Missouri Ban Youth Executions (BYE) Coalition in
Support of Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No.
03-633) (arguing that the assessment of common evolving standards of
decency should receive broad consideration).
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usions.” 173 We need not look far. The Canadian Supreme Court
eliminated accessorial felony murder liability because such punishment
runs counter to “the principle that punishment must be proportionate
to the moral blameworthiness of the offender.” 174 The United Kingdom
does not employ the felony murder rule; its “joint enterprise” law covers
accomplices in murder, but applies only when the offender has
“foresight” and “intention.” 175 The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child articulates that juveniles should receive special
protective treatment in criminal sentencing. 176
In assessing the nation’s evolving standards of decency, the
Supreme Court has asserted that legislative enactments are the
“clearest and most reliable evidence” of a social consensus. 177 Thus, the
number of states that exclude juveniles from the felony murder rule
may be most relevant in establishing an evolving national standard.178
Even though many states only limit the rule’s application to juveniles,
not prohibit it, further evidence of societal practices recognizing
juveniles’ differentness and diminished culpability supports the
proposition that the felony murder rule, as applied to juveniles,

173. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred
Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 743, 891 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court often
“consult[s] foreign sources of law to evaluate the reasonableness of
American legal practices . . . in determining whether American criminal
law punishments violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments’”).
174. See R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (Can.); see also Liptak, supra
note 30; Dennis Baker & Troy Riddell, Elimination of Felony-Murder May
Help Rafferty, Nat’l Post (May 11, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://nationalpost.
com/opinion/dennis-baker-troy-riddell-elimination-of-felony-murder-mayhelp-rafferty [https://perma.cc/RY4G-8LMH] (stating that the Canadian
Supreme Court found that a person must have “subjective foresight of
death” to be found guilty of murder).
175. Lussenhop, supra note 1.
176. G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/25, art. 37(a)–(b) (Dec. 15, 1989) (“No child shall be subjected
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of
release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen
years of age. . . . The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child . . . shall
be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time.”).
177. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 312 (2002)); see also Guyora Binder et al., Unusual: The Death
Penalty for Inadvertent Killing, 93 Ind. L.J. 549, 558 (2018).
178. See Binder et al., supra note 177.
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constitutes excessive and disproportionate sentencing and thus cruel
and unusual punishment.
B. Categorical Exclusions from Specific Crimes for Certain Classes of
Defendants

Opponents of exempting juveniles from the felony murder rule
express concern that treating juveniles differently under the doctrine
will create an unconstitutional special class. 179 The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” 180 The Supreme Court’s treatment of juveniles as
inherently different when determining the applicability of severe
sentences, such as the death penalty and life without parole, does not
implicate equal-protection concerns. The Supreme Court in Roper v.
Simmons recognized, through an analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against cruel and unusual punishments, that juveniles, as a
class, are inherently less culpable than adults. 181 True, this protection
is “inflected with equality concerns,” 182 but it still “seems to lie far
beyond the traditional domain of equal protection.” 183 Juveniles are not
a group of the general population who are receiving special treatment;
rather they are fundamentally different from others (adults) in their
reduced culpability. Consequently, they deserve treatment in prop–
ortion to that reduced culpability. 184 Additionally, the Supreme Court
has consistently upheld distinct treatment for specific classes of people.
The United States has experienced a shift in the public’s perception
of the death penalty that has led to a greater hesitancy to impose it,
particularly on those deemed categorically less culpable or whose
actions are not severe enough to justify such a punishment.185
Developments in societal perceptions, the law, and the social sciences
179. McCann, supra note 165 (stating that some Colorado district attorneys
argued that a Colorado statute creating sentencing options for juveniles
who had received unconstitutional sentences treated juveniles as a
“‘special class’ of individuals on whom a certain benefit was bestowed,”
contrary to Colorado’s constitutional principles).
180. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
181. 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
182. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 791
(2011).
183. Id. at 792.
184. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; id. at 599 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Binder et al., supra note 155, at 1551 (“[B]ecause execution is now very
rare, application of the death penalty to any class of offenders may seem
‘cruel and unusual’ in the sense of violating ‘evolving standards of
decency.’”).
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have guided the evolution of our standards of decency, leading the
Supreme Court to overrule some of its previous decisions and
compelling new conclusions concerning what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. 186
In Atkins v. Virginia, 187 the Supreme Court, after considering our
“evolving standards of decency,” held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities.188
Daryl Atkins is a mentally disabled man who abducted, robbed, and
shot his victim to death. 189 The Supreme Court recognized that the
mentally disabled have a fundamentally diminished personal culpa–
bility, even though they may be capable of distinguishing right from
wrong. 190 This argument parallels juveniles’ diminished culpability in
that juveniles have the cognitive capacity to understand the realities of
a situation, yet lack the full capacity to use responsibility, perspective,
and reasoned risk-assessment in their decision-making. 191
In Enmund v. Florida, 192 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on a
defendant who participates in a felony resulting in a death but does not
murder, attempt to murder, or intend to murder. 193 Earl Enmund and
two others, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong, were indicted for the
robbery and first-degree murder of the Kerseys at the Kerseys’
farmhouse. 194 Enmund drove his co-defendants to the Kerseys’ residence
to rob the elderly couple. 195 Enmund remained in the getaway car while
his co-defendants robbed and murdered them victims when they
resisted the burglary. 196 The Court recognized that offenders such as
Enmund are “categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of

186. See id.
187. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
188. Id. at 321. Contra Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment did not categorically prohibit the execution
of the mentally handicapped).
189. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
190. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 318–20).
191. Id. at 569.
192. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
193. Id. at 788.
194. Id. at 784.
195. Id. at 784, 786, 788.
196. Id. at 786, 788.
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punishment than are murderers” 197 and thus prohibited the death
penalty for felony murder offenders with minimal involvement in a
murder other than participating in the underlying felony. 198 The Court
did not believe that the penological goal of deterrence would be served
by the imposition of such a harsh sentence on someone “who does not
kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken.”199
Continuing, the Court held that a defendant’s culpability is limited to
his participation and “his punishment must be tailored to his personal
responsibility and moral guilt.” 200
In Coker v. Georgia, 201 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the death penalty for a defendant who raped
an adult woman because death is a “grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime.” 202 Coker broke into the Carvers’
house after he escaped from a correctional institution raped Mrs.
Carver, and stole the Carvers’ car before he was apprehended. 203 The
Court assessed the contemporary social view of sentencing rapist to
death by reviewing recent cases, history, and objective evidence. In
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 204 the Court ruled that both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments proscribe as excessive the death penalty’s
imposition for the rape of a child. 205 Patrick Kennedy was sentenced to
death for the rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter, whose resulting
injuries were so severe that she required emergency surgeries. 206 The
state court recognized that death would serve the deterrent and
retributive purposes of punishment and that the defendant did not
possess any mitigating characteristics limiting his culpability, such as

197. Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2015) (explaining that robbery is not
as severe to the victim as murder and thus does not warrant the death
penalty for the offender).
198. The Supreme Court looked to sentencing practices to determine whether
the imposition of the death penalty would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment and recognized that “only a small minority of jurisdictions
. . . allow[ed] the death penalty to be imposed solely because the
defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a
murder was committed.” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792.
199. Id. at 798–99.
200. Id. at 801.
201. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
202. Id. at 592.
203. Id. at 587.
204. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
205. Id. at 421.
206. Id. at 414–17.
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mental disability or youthfulness. 207 Despite this, objective indicia of
evolving standards of decency and the Supreme Court’s understanding
of the Eighth Amendment led the Court to conclude that the Amend–
ment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child. 208
C. Excluding Juveniles from Punishment for Acts that Would Be Crimes
if Committed by Adults

Juveniles’ poor decision-making skills and impulsive behavior
renders them susceptible to engaging in risky behavior. Many states
account for these characteristics and seek to protect juveniles from
suffering unduly harsh consequences by excluding them from the severe
punishments that would be imposed on adults who commit the same
crimes. 209 Age-gap laws and “Romeo and Juliet clauses” 210 provide
exceptions for juveniles from statutory rape laws, or mitigate sentencing
thereunder, for juveniles engaged in consensual sexual acts. 211 Statutory
rape laws seek to protect minors by establishing a minimum age of
consent for an adult to engage in sexual activity with a juvenile on the
premise that juveniles cannot give legal consent to engage in sexual
activity “even if they are a willing participant.” 212 A key basis upon
which legislatures rest this reasoning is that juveniles’ unfinished devel–
opment renders them unable to “make mature, informed decisions” or
to fully deliberate the potential consequences of sexual activity. 213 These
207. Id. at 418.
208. The Court held that “a death sentence for one who raped but did not kill
a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at
421.
209. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 28–29.
210. For teenagers in “close-in-age” relationships, age-gap laws establish
reductions in or exceptions from sentencing that would apply if adults
committed the same acts. Brittany Logino Smith & Glen A.
Kercher, Crime Victims’ Institute, Adolescent Sexual Behavior
10–11 (2011), available at http://www.crimevictimsinstitute.org/documents/
Adolescent_Behavior_3.1.11.pdf) [https://perma.cc/WAZ2-MUED]. “[O]ff–
ender[s] . . . will not be subject to the same punishments as those who
commit the crime outside of the age gap provision. In other words, . . .
close-in-age teenage relationships need not have the same consequences as
those of older adults seeking to sexually exploit minors.” Id. at 10. Romeoand-Juliet clauses are provisions that can, but do not necessarily, reduce
sentencing or exclude juveniles from sentencing. These clauses can provide
juveniles with an affirmative defense under certain circumstances,
including engaging in consensual sexual acts with another close-in-age
juvenile. Id. at 11.
211. See Kern, supra note 20, at 1613.
212. Logino Smith & Kercher, supra note 210, at 6–7.
213. Id. at 7.
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qualities that render juveniles susceptible to harm, and that lawmakers
argue warrant legislative protection, are the same qualities that should
grant juveniles sentencing exemptions and special treatment because
they frustrate the purposes of punishment and lead to disproportionate
sentences. 214
Consenting juveniles of the same age, or a consenting juvenile and
a somewhat older partner, who engage in sexual activity can fall under
statutory rape laws. 215 Convicting these juveniles under statutory rape
laws does not serve the purpose of the law—to protect juveniles. Agegap laws and Romeo-and-Juliet clauses function to address the same
fundamental differentness between juveniles and adults that the
Supreme Court addressed in Roper, a differentness which the felony
murder rule should also recognize. Adolescents do not engage in a
reasoned analysis of predictable consequences and instead engage in
impulsive thrill-seeking behavior. 216 This often leads developing teen–
agers to engage in consensual sexual acts despite being several years
apart in age. 217 The law has limited the potentially severe consequences
of violating statutory rape laws, which could include a felony convic–
tion, up to ten years in prison, and required registration on the sex
offender registry for ten years or more. 218 Some statutory rape laws
reduce juveniles’ punishments by lowering the crime’s classification
from a felony to a misdemeanor, limiting the required time they would
have to register on the sex-offender list (or eliminating this requirement
altogether), or limiting any prison sentence to a few months instead of
a few years. 219 Additionally, instead of reducing punishment, these
exceptions may allow courts to totally exclude juveniles from any
punishment, treating the juveniles as if they committed no crime
although the same acts would be crimes if committed by adults. 220

214. See People in Interest of T.B., No. 16CA1289, 2019 WL 2528764, *6–8
(Colo. Ct. App. June 20, 2019) (holding that, in light of juveniles’
differentness and the lasting consequences of sex-offender registration, it
was excessive to require a juvenile to register as a sex offender for the rest
of his life).
215. See Logino Smith & Kercher, supra note 210, at 6.
216. See generally Kelsey Dumond, Note, “Cast Me Not Away!”: The Plight of
Modern Day Romeo and Juliet, 36 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 455 (2018)
(discussing teenagers’ impulsive tendencies regarding their sexual
behavior).
217. Id. at 460–61.
218. Id. at 464.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 467–68 (identifying various state legislatures’ approaches to
Romeo-and-Juliet laws and exemptions from those laws).
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States have enacted similar Romeo-and-Juliet-type provisions for
teens and young adults under “sexting” and child pornography laws.221
Sexting involves sending text messages that contain sexual content and
nude or explicit photos. 222 A minor who engages in sexting by sending
explicit images of their self, or receiving explicit images of another
minor, partakes in the creation and possession of child pornography.223
The purpose of child pornography laws is to protect children and
prevent child sexual abuse by punishing and precluding the distri–
bution, creation, and possession of sexually suggestive and explicit
images of children that can be a record or means of child sexual abuse.224
This purpose, and punishment’s general deterrent, retributive, and
rehabilitative purposes, are not served when minors are convicted under
anti-child-pornography laws for sexting. 225 Juveniles cannot appreciate
the potentially serious consequences of sending “sext” messages.226
221. Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Weigh Teenage Sexting: Folly or Felony?,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/us/
prosecutors-in-teenage-sexting-cases-ask-foolishness-or-a-felony.html [https:
//perma.cc/T2KQ-T5KZ].
222. Teresa Nelson, Minnesota Prosecutor Charges Sexting Teenage Girl with
Child Pornography, ACLU (Jan. 5, 2018, 11:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/juvenile-justice/minnesota-prosecutor-charges-sexting-teenage-girlchild-pornography [https://perma.cc/YP9Y-CEQ5].
223. See Natasha Marie Landon, Note, Sexting: The 21st Century’s Digital
Lovers’ Lane, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 591, 594 (2018) (“Due to the nature of the
beast, teen sexting is by definition the creation of child pornography.”).
The federal child-pornography law provides: “Any person who . . . know–
ingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute,
a visual depiction of any kind . . . that depicts a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene . . . or attempts or conspires to
do so, shall be subject to . . . penalties.” 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a) (2012).
Child pornography includes “any photography, film, video, picture, digital
image or picture, computer image or picture, computer generated image
or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means.” Id. § 1466A(f); see also Eckholm, supra note 221 (“[W]hen a 16year-old girl emails a raunchy picture of herself to a boy, she has in theory
created and distributed child pornography. If the boy sends the picture to
20 others, he has distributed, and they all have possessed, child
pornography.”).
224. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–60 (1982); see also Nelson,
supra note 222.
225. See Nelson, supra note 222.
226. See, e.g., Brooke Glover & Aine Kervick, Youth Justice Part Two: Mini
Sex Offenders or Just Kids?, Kingsley Napley (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/criminal-law-blog/youthjustice-part-two-mini-sex-offenders-or-just-kids#page=1 [https://perma.cc/
6V2B-72DL] (quoting the English government’s response to a report on
juvenile crime in England and Wales, which noted that “cases of ‘sexting’
can be damaging to both the victim and the perpetrator. It can be difficult
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Additionally, state statutes are specifically designed to criminalize the
activities of adults taking advantage of juveniles, not necessarily
juveniles who are in sexual relationships with each other. 227
Even if juveniles are charged with felonies under anti-childpornography laws, prosecutors and judges often exhibit great leniency
in those cases. 228 In Minnesota, a fourteen-year-old girl sent an explicit
photo of herself through Snapchat, a smartphone application that
allows users to send images that automatically delete after a certain
amount of time. 229 The Minnesota teen’s photo was saved and distrib–
uted to other teens, and she was consequently charged with felony child
pornography distribution, a charge that could result in her mandatory
registration as a sex offender for ten years. 230 The trial court dismissed
the felony charges against her, asserting that the law’s purpose was not
served by punishing the teen. 231 The Minnesota law’s purpose is to
protect children from harms resulting from their involvement in
pornographic work. 232 But the teen girl facing conviction was not the
type of “victim” the statute sought to address; she was only “exhibiting
for young people to understand the implications of these activities, or to
consider that once an image has been shared they have no control over
its distribution.”).
227. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, In the Matter of the Welfare
of Juvenile 17, at 11–12 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Juv. Div. Feb. 20, 2018),
available at https://www.aclu-mn.org/sites/default/files/redacted_order_
granting_motion.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5EX-JYC3] [hereinafter Juvenile
17 Order].
228. Eckholm, supra note 221 (noting that many states have adopted laws to
“address juvenile sexting by providing a less severe range of legal
responses to personal photo-sharing, including misdemeanor charges that
may be expunged, and required community service or counseling”); see
also Juvenile 17 Order, supra note 227, at 19 (demonstrating leniency in
dismissing sexting charges brought against a fourteen-year-old girl).
229. Jana Kooren, Victory! Judge Dismisses Charges in Minneosta Teen
Sexting Case, ACLU of Minn. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.aclumn.org/en/press-releases/victory-judge-dismisses-charges-minnesota-teensexting-case [https://perma.cc/S5FN-AW5U]; see also Christina Newberry,
How to Use Snapchat: A Guide for Beginners, Hootsuite: Blog (Jan.
9, 2018), https://blog.hootsuite.com/how-to-use-snapchat-beginners-guide/
[https://perma.cc/2UXZ-PV62].
230. Nelson, supra note 222.
231. The judge stated that punishing the teen would “produce[] an absurd,
unreasonable, and unjust result that utterly confounds the statute’s stated
purpose.” Kooren, supra note 229. He continued, “[t]his Court cannot see
how subjecting [the juvenile] to registering as a sexual offender would
protect her or teach her anything but that the justice system is cruel and
unjust.” Id.
232. Nelson, supra note 222.

171

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
Considering a Juvenile Exception to the Felony Murder Rule

normal adolescent behavior in the digital age.” 233 Legislatures do not
seek to punish “youths who in all likelihood haven’t the vaguest idea
that what they are doing is felonious because so many of them do it,
apparently without a thought.” 234 Punishing this teen, or the many
other teens exploring sexual behavior through sexting, would subject
her to great harm while failing to serve the intended purposes of antichild-pornography laws.
Similarly, punishing juveniles under the felony murder rule with
lengthy prison sentences subjects them to great harm and greatly
reduces their chances of rehabilitating, despite their strong propensity
to do so. Juveniles charged under the felony murder rule generally
understand that they are engaging in a felonious activity, but they do
so “without a thought” 235 for the serious consequences of engaging in
such activities; just as juveniles who sext do not consider the serious
consequences of violating an anti-child-pornography law. 236 Sentencing
juveniles to lengthy prison terms or other harsh punishments does not
serve the felony murder rule’s purposes, just as applying child-porn–
ography laws to consensually sexting teens does not serve to protect
children. 237 The applications of Romeo-and-Juliet-type laws discussed
above account for both juveniles’ behavior and their development,
reflecting a systemic acceptance of juveniles’ “differentness,” showing a
willingness to exhibit greater tolerance for juveniles’ actions (compared
to adults’ actions), and, accordingly, exempting juveniles from punish–
ments for activities that would be crimes if adults did them. 238
D. Limiting and Reevaluating Sentencing Based on Age

Courts have often considered age and its accompanying
characteristics—which offenders cannot control—as mitigating factors
in sentencing. Specifically, courts account for age in determining
whether a punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the crime
committed. In sentencing juveniles, courts have considered whether the
sentence will result in de facto life imprisonment and whether it will
serve punishment’s overarching penological goals.

233. Id.
234. Juvenile 17 Order, supra note 227, at 17.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 17.
237. See Burton, supra note 26, at 189; see also Nelson, supra note 222.
238. See generally Logino Smith & Kercher, supra note 210, at 8, 10–11;
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 19–20, 28–29.
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Accounting for Youth in Juvenile Sentencing

Recently, in People v. Rodriguez, 239 the Appellate Court of Illinois
held that it was unconstitutional to sentence a fifteen-year-old
defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-five years because
it constituted a de facto life sentence. 240 In that case, Rodriguez fired a
gun in a gang-related drive-by shooting that killed eighteen-year-old
Ricardo Vasquez. 241 A divided panel vacated Rodriguez’s sentence,
requiring that Rodriguez’s youth, and its attendant circumstances, be
considered in resentencing. 242 The concurring judge emphasized that
proposed changes in Illinois’ statutes illustrate the legislature’s recog–
nition that juveniles should not be treated the same way as adult
offenders. 243 This example aside, courts struggle when considering what
role a juvenile’s age should play when determining whether their
sentence is constitutional. 244
In State v. Null, 245 the defendant was sixteen years old when he shot
and killed Kevin Bell during a robbery of Bell’s apartment. 246 Null
received a seventy-five-year aggregate sentence, of which he was
required to serve at least 52.5 years before he would be eligible for
parole—that is, he would be in prison at least until he was sixty-nine
years old. 247 Null argued that the 52.5-year prison term effectively
amounted to a life sentence because his life expectancy as an AfricanAmerican male was only 51.7 years. 248 The Supreme Court of Iowa
239. 118 N.E.3d 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
240. Id. at 569, 574. Rodriguez’s mandatory forty-five-year sentence ran
consecutively to a different twenty-year sentence for first-degree murder.
Consequently, Rodriguez was required to serve a sixty-five-year sentence
and would not be released from prison until he was eighty-three years old.
Id. at 559–60.
241. Id. at 559.
242. Id. at 574.
243. Id. at 576 (McBride, J., concurring).
244. Id. (“Although Miller does not specifically speak to de facto life sentences,
. . . the letter and spirit of Miller requires us to . . . allow relief to those
who are serving lengthy mandatory minimum sentences that amount to
de facto life sentences in prison without parole. Courts however have
struggled with how to apply Miller in such cases, and how to determine
what kind of sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence.”).
245. 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).
246. Id. at 45.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 50–51 (“[T]he life expectancy of a twenty-year-old black male [Null’s
age at the time of this appeal] is 51.7 years.”). Null argued that he would
be released in poor health “to die on the streets after spending all his
adult years in prison.” Id. at 51.
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recognized that the 52.5-year sentence was not formally a life sentence,
but the court applied the rationales for limiting severe juvenile
sentencing 249 and emphasized that geriatric release “does not provide a
‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the ‘maturity and rehabil–
itation’ required to obtain release and reenter society as required by
Graham.” 250 Likewise, in State v. Williams, 251 the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina held that a life sentence without the possibility of parole
for a seventeen-year-old defendant convicted of two counts of firstdegree murder was unconstitutional 252 because the defendant was not
irreparably corrupt and thus he deserved an opportunity to demon–
strate rehabilitation. 253 In State v. Bassett, 254 the sixteen-year-old
defendant received three life sentences without the possibility of parole
when he and a friend shot his parents and drowned his brother.255
Despite the cruel nature of the crime, the Supreme Court of Washington
found that its state constitution barred the imposition of a life sentence
without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders because lifelong
incapacitation “is at odds with . . . children’s capacity for change,” and
so such a punishment would not serve any penological purpose. 256 Even
249. Id. at 71 (“Even if lesser sentences than life without parole might be less
problematic, we do not regard the juvenile’s potential future release in his
or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration sufficient to escape
the rationales of Graham or Miller.”).
250. Id.; see also People v. Buffer (Buffer I), 75 N.E.3d 470 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017), aff’d, No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019). In Buffer,
the court held that a fifty-year sentence imposed on a sixteen-year-old for
shooting and killing a woman constituted an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence. Id. at 471. Buffer would have been sixty-six on his projected
parole date and sixty-nine on his parole discharge date. The court found
that “as a practical matter, [Buffer], whose average life expectancy is at
best 64 years, will not have a meaningful opportunity for release.” Id. at
482. The concurring judge emphasized that courts should focus on a
juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation in sentencing because juveniles “have
a larg[e] and potentially unlimited ability to change as they mature, and
those changes can be for the better, or unfortunately, for the worse,
depending in large part on their own history when dropped into the
surroundings and experiences of prison.” Id. at 486 (Pucinski, J.,
concurring).
251. 820 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
252. Id. at 522 (“[C]ourts in all jurisdictions are still discerning the appropriate
criteria and methodology for imposing the harshest of sentences on young
people whose entire lives lie before them and whose potential for change
is generally unknowable.”).
253. Id. at 526.
254. 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018).
255. Id. at 346.
256. Id. at 353.
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if a sentence imposed on a juvenile is “survivable,” 257 it should still be
proportionate to the underlying offense and allow the convicted juvenile
a meaningful opportunity for release. Especially given a juvenile’s
susceptibility to influence, a convicted juvenile should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate her rehabilitation via a useful life outside
prison in which they positively contribute to society. 258 A severely
lengthy prison sentence that denies a juvenile that opportunity cannot
be proportionate to the crime of felony murder, particularly when the
juvenile did not “pull the trigger.”
Cyntoia Brown’s case illustrates states’ recent willingness to
account for juvenile differentness by readdressing harsh sentencing. 259
Cyntoia Brown was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder,
first-degree felony murder, and “especially aggravated robbery” when
she shot and killed Johnny Mitchell Allen in his home in 2004. 260 Brown
was sixteen years old when Allen picked her up in his truck at a Sonic
257. See People v. Buffer (Buffer II), No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435, at *8 (Ill.
Apr. 18, 2019) (assessing the length of a juvenile’s prison term as
“survivable”).
258. See supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text; infra notes 290–291 and
accompanying text.
259. Additionally, for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of a
lengthy sentence, courts have sometimes treated offenders over eighteen
years old as though they were juveniles with diminished culpability. In
People v. House, 72 N.E.3d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), the Appellate Court
of Illinois held that a mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional for a
defendant who was nineteen years old at the time of the crime. Id. at 389.
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated the judgment in People
v. House, 111 N.E.3d 940 (Ill. 2018), the Appellate Court’s reasoning
illustrates increased state willingness to recognize juvenile differentness.
House, under the orders of a higher-ranking gang member, acted as a
lookout while his fellow gang members murdered two opposing gang
members; House was consequently convicted under the theory of
accountability. Id. at 389. The sentencing court did not consider
mitigating factors such as House’s youthfulness, his lack of a prior violent
criminal history, or his minimal participation in the murders. Id. at 389.
House was not the actual shooter but he received the same sentence as
the “person who pulled the trigger.” Id. at 385. Just like Lakeith Smith,
Timothy Kane, and Curtis Brooks—who all were given severe sentences
for felony murder when they merely participated in felonies that caused
deaths—House did not pull the trigger. See supra notes 1–14 and
accompanying text. The Illinois Appellate Court nonetheless concluded
that House did not have the requisite culpability for a lengthy, severe prison
sentence due in part to his age and juvenile differentness.
260. State v. Brown, No. M2007-00427-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1038275, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2009); see also Mallory Gafas & Tina
Burnside, Cyntoia Brown Is Granted Clemency After Serving 15 Years in
Prison for Killing Man Who Bought Her for Sex, CNN (Jan. 8, 2019, 5:31
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/us/tennessee-cyntoia-browngranted-clemency/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5NP-KMP8].
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Drive-In in Nashville and took her back to his home to engage in sexual
activity. 261 Brown was a runaway and a sex-trafficking victim, 262 stating
that her boyfriend had often abused her and “made her leave with other
men.” 263 With Allen, Brown feared that she would be harmed and used
a gun she kept in her purse to shoot Allen in the middle of the night.
Brown then stole a rifle, a shotgun, and $172 from Allen before driving
away in his truck. 264 The Tennessee trial court imposed a mandatory
life sentence of sixty years requiring Brown to serve at least fifty-one
years of the sentence before she would be eligible for release. 265 In 2018,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee accepted a certified question from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit arising from
Brown’s case and determined that requiring a defendant convicted of
first-degree murder to serve fifty-one years before becoming eligible for
release was consistent with Tennessee law. 266 Less than a year later,
however, the state recognized that Brown’s sentence was excessive and
severe: in January 2019, Tennessee’s governor granted clemency to
Cyntoia Brown after she served fifteen years of her sentence. 267
Brown’s case garnered attention from lawmakers, attorneys, and
several notable celebrities, all who advocated for greater leniency in the
justice system’s treatment of Brown, and juvenile victims in general
because of juveniles’ propensity for rehabilitation. 268 While in prison,
Brown worked to earn both her high-school-equivalency diploma and
an associate degree, and she began working towards a bachelor’s
degree. 269 Governor Bill Haslam emphasized that Brown’s sentence was
too harsh in light of her “extraordinary” character transformation.270
The founder of an organization to end sex trafficking in Tennessee
261. Brown, 2009 WL 1038275, at *3; see also Gafas & Burnside, supra note
260.
262. Gafas & Burnside, supra note 260.
263. Brown, 2009 WL 1038275, at *9.
264. Id. at *3.
265. Gafas & Burnside, supra note 260; Christine Hauser, Cyntoia Brown is
Granted Clemency After 15 Years in Prison, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/cyntoia-brown-clemency-granted.
html [https://perma.cc/2NVF-MAPW].
266. Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tenn. 2018) (“Will a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder . . . and sentenced to life in prison under
[Tennessee law] become eligible for release and, if so, after how many
years?”).
267. Gafas & Burnside, supra note 260.
268. Id.
269. Hauser, supra note 265.
270. Id. The Governor added: “Transformation should be accompanied by
hope.” Id.
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remarked that “[Brown] is light years today, as a woman, different from
the traumatized 16-year-old that she was.” 271 Brown’s case evidences
that juveniles’ characters are malleable and that many of their
characteristics are transient. As a teenager, Brown was controlled and
victimized, leading her to make dangerous and violent decisions after
she ran away from home. 272 But when she was exposed to positive
influences, albeit in prison, Brown became a model prisoner and reached
a high degree of academic achievement.
Similarly, Timothy Kane’s 273 early release from prison in light of his
juvenile differentness and exemplary behavior while in prison further
supports that juveniles’ characteristics are not fixed. In 2017, after his
parole hearing, thirty-nine-year-old Timothy Kane was released from
prison after serving twenty-five years of his life sentence for particip–
ating in a robbery that resulted in a death. 274 Kane received no
disciplinary citations while in prison, and he educated visiting teens
about the consequences of engaging in crime. 275 His isolated and
impulsive decision as a fourteen-year-old boy in no way reflected an
irreparable character as he grew older. Although juveniles are suscep–
tible to engaging in crimes, particularly crimes that have a high risk of
resulting in death, they are simultaneously receptive to positive
influences and rehabilitative efforts. 276

271. Gafas & Burnside, supra note 260.
272. See id.; see also Hauser, supra note 265.
273. In addition to the discussion below, see supra notes 11–12, 64–65, 265 and
their accompanying text for more on Kane’s case.
274. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text; Lois Swoboda, Kane
Released After 24 Years in Prison, The Apalachicola & Carrabelle
Times (Mar. 9, 2017, 10:37 AM), https://www.apalachtimes.com/news/
20170309/kane-released-after-24-years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/887HR7GR] (“Kane received no disciplinary reports in his 24 years of
incarceration for murder. He completed his GED, worked for the prison
chaplain and spoke to teens who visit the prison as part of a ‘scared
straight’ program.”).
275. Swoboda, supra note 274; John Romano, The Kid Who Went to Prison
Has Come Home a Man, Tampa Bay Times (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.
tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/romano-the-kid-who-went-to-prisonhas-come-home-as-a-man/2315361/ [https://perma.cc/4KBJ-2NXJ].
276. See Sharon Cohen & Adam Geller, After 2016 Supreme Court Ruling,
Battles over Juvenile Lifer Cases Persist, Denver Post (Jan. 25, 2019,
3:47 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/01/20/juvenile-life-in-prison2016-supreme-court-case/ [https://perma.cc/56AM-ESTX] (noting that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery “hinged partly on research
showing the brains of adolescents are slow to develop, making teen
offenders likelier to act recklessly but capable of rehabilitation”).
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Accounting for Old Age in Sentencing

Courts’ sentencing practices regarding senior citizens offer a
different view of how courts consider age when determining whether a
punishment is excessive or proportionate to the crime committed. The
sentencing of individuals over sixty-five years old may provide further
objective evidence of courts’ willingness to account for age. Senior
offenders cannot control characteristics that accompany old age, just as
juvenile offenders cannot control those accompanying youthfulness. 277
Courts account for age in determining a sentence’s length as well as its
constitutionality precisely because offenders cannot control it. 278 Elderly
defendants are subject to what could be potentially lengthy and harsh
sentences considering their relatively poor physical condition and
significantly shorter lifespan. 279 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for
instance, allow a court to consider an elderly and infirm defendant’s
age and accompanying health problems for the purpose of reducing the
defendant’s sentence. 280
Courts can consider those same age-related characteristics when
deciding to sentence an elderly defendant to some alternative form of
incarceration or punishment, so long as the alternatives are as effective
as imprisonment. 281 When Bill Cosby was sentenced for aggravated
indecent assault in April 2018, his attorney asked for house arrest
because eighty-one-year-old “blind men who are not self-sufficient are
not a danger, unless perhaps to themselves.” 282 Cosby’s defense lawyers
stressed his feeble physical condition in the hope of limiting his
sentence. Cosby was ruled a “sexually violent predator,” deemed likely
to engage in sexually violent offenses and was subsequently sentenced
to three to ten years in state prison. 283 His sentence may effectively be
a “life sentence” 284 because, considering Cosby’s age and legal blindness,

277. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 757–59.
278. See Cohen & Geller, supra note 276.
279. See John Elgion & Benjamin Weiser, Weighing Prison When the Convict
Is Over 80, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/
10/10/nyregion/10astor.html [https://perma.cc/TE65-ATYX].
280. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.4 (U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 2018).
281. Id.
282. Eric Levenson & Aaron Cooper, Bill Cosby Sentenced to 3 to 10 years in
Prison for Sexual Assault, CNN (Sept. 26, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/09/25/us/bill-cosby-sentence-assault/index.html [https://
perma.cc/56AM-ESTX].
283. Id.
284. See Elgion & Weiser, supra note 279 (discussing the varying degrees in
which age factors in to sentencing “octogenarians,” and noting that “for
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he may not live through it. Cosby, however, could have received a
thirty-year sentence as he was convicted of three counts of aggravated
indecent assault, each carrying a maximum sentence of ten years.285
Although Cosby effectively received a “severe” sentence, it was still
significantly less harsh than what younger offenders who committed the
same crime would have received, due in part to the court’s accounting
of his advanced age in sentencing. 286 Similarly, in 2017, Pennsylvania’s
Crawford County Court of Common Pleas sentenced David Fucci, a
sixty-six-year-old man, to a “lengthy” sentence of six-and-one-half to
thirteen years in state prison for multiple counts of illegal drug
possession and activity. 287 Fucci could have received a total sentence of
over one hundred years in prison. 288
When sentencing senior citizens, courts consider that a prison
sentence will constitute a significant percentage of the remainder of the
defendant’s life. Conversely, juvenile sentences will constitute a smaller
percentage of the juvenile’s remaining life as compared to adults
sentenced to the same term of years. But just as an elderly offender
cannot control her advanced age or its accompanying characteristics,
juvenile offenders cannot control their youthfulness or any other agerelated characteristic. Juveniles, unlike senior citizens, are still
cognitively developing; consequently, they have a greater capacity for
rehabilitation and change. Courts may still issue harsh sentences to
culpable juveniles so long as courts take into account both the juveniles’
youthfulness and their fundamental differentness, and the sentence is
proportionate to the crime.

IV. A Juvenile Exception from Adult Sentencing
Under the Felony Murder Rule
Society appreciates that juveniles are inherently less culpable than
adults and that they should not be punished under the felony murder
rule. This conclusion is supported by objective evidence of our evolving
the oldest defendants even a short prison term ‘may very well be a life
sentence’”).
285. Dominic Patten, Bill Cosby to Get Less than Three Years Behind Bars
for 2004 Rape, Says Judge, Deadline Hollywood (Sept. 24, 2018, 10:48
PM), https://deadline.com/2018/09/bill-cosby-sentence-three-years-likelyjudge-says-1202470189/[https://perma.cc/D2PE-MXCA].
286. See id.; see also Levenson & Cooper, supra note 282.
287. Keith Gushard, Full Story: Admitted Pill Dealer Gets Lengthy State Prison
Sentence, Meadville Trib. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.meadvilletribune.
com/news/local_news/full-story-admitted-pill-dealer-gets-lengthy-stateprison-sentence/article_5d7e361a-d2d7-11e6-91f2-0ba3061cfaee.html [https:
//perma.cc/LM7P-L7T6].
288. Id.
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standards of decency, including: (1) courts’ accounting for juvenile
differentness; (2) the Supreme Court’s categorical exclusion of specific
classes of offenders from certain punishments; (3) the exclusion of
juveniles from punishments that would be imposed if adults commit the
same crime; and (4) courts’ considerations of age as a limiting factor in
sentencing. Although states have taken steps in revising their senten–
cing schemes to account for juveniles’ youthfulness, no state has categ–
orically excluded juveniles from the felony murder rule. 289 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court is not likely to hold that the states’ practices evince
an evolving national standard. The Court also seems unlikely to hold
that the felony murder rule as applied to juveniles implicates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 290 But even
if the Supreme Court does not recognize a sufficient evolving national
standard to categorically exclude juveniles from the felony murder rule,
states are still free to do so. States are also free to limit the rule’s
application to juveniles. Eventually, state legislative actions limiting
the application of the felony murder rule to juveniles, or excluding them
from adult-type sentencing under the rule, will be enough to show the
Supreme Court that there is a new, clear national standard by which it
can conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the application of
the felony murder rule to juveniles.
States should curb the imposition of excessive and harsh
punishments on juveniles through revised sentencing standards that
exclude juveniles from adult sentencing under the felony murder rule.
A standard under which juveniles receive specialized sentencing for
felonies that result in death will result in effective punishment that
accounts for juveniles’ differentness. In order to avoid imposing
excessive and disproportionate punishments, juveniles’ felony-murder
sentences should not be for such an extensive length that the juveniles
are effectively denied a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their
rehabilitation and maturity. 291 In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme
Court did not require that juveniles be released from prison simply with
289. See supra notes 156–158 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 153–154, 177 and accompanying text.
291. See Straley, supra note 161, at 987; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 74 (2010) (emphasizing the importance of providing juvenile offenders
an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation and stressing
that the denial of a juvenile’s right to reenter the community “is not
appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for
change and limited moral culpability”); People v. Buffer (Buffer I), 75
N.E.3d 470, 488 (Ill. Ct. App. 2017) (Pucinski, J., concurring) (citing
Roper’s underlying principle that juveniles have a great capacity for
change and states must allow juveniles the meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate their rehabilitation), aff’d, No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435
(Ill. Apr. 18, 2019).
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enough time to outlast their confinement for a trivial amount of time.292
Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders are
entitled to live upon release from prison for “some appreciable
period.” 293
Juveniles have great capacities for change; specialized juvenile
sentences should provide them with sufficient time outside prison for
them to demonstrate their rehabilitation. Cyntoia Brown’s develop–
ment from a sixteen-year-old girl at sentencing into a markedly
different, educated, and motivated woman clearly evinces the transitory
nature of juveniles’ characteristics, their maturation, and their recept–
iveness to rehabilitation. 294 Several years after committing a felony that
results in death, a juvenile will not be the same person she was when
she committed the crime. 295 Lengthy sentences like Brown’s do not
provide juveniles a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate rehabilit–
ation. 296
To allow for such an opportunity, courts should calculate a
juvenile’s sentence for felony murder based on her average life
expectancy. This approach will also serve penological goals by preven–
ting juveniles from serving de facto life sentences or other excessive
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. 297 Courts
292. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; Straley, supra note 161, at 987 (“The Supreme
Court in Graham viewed the concept of ‘life’ as broader than simply
biological survival. It implicitly endorsed the notion that release from
prison should be available at a time at which a defendant might actually
‘live’ outside the prison walls for some appreciable period.”).
293. Straley, supra note 161, at 987; Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70.
294. See supra notes 260–272 and accompanying text.
295. Wadhwani & Tamburin, supra note 67. In response to Brown’s case, a
Tennessee senator recognized that there are many juveniles in similar
situations as Brown and that “[a]s horrific as it sounds that a child
committed murder, the person they are now is not the person they will be
in 20 years.” Id. An attorney who represents another juvenile imprisoned
for murder stressed that the criminal justice system should understand
and work to account for “[t]he fact that we [all] grow and change and
mature.” Id.
296. Other attorneys who represent juveniles convicted under a felony-murder
statute have used Brown’s case as an example: “The whole premise of
[Miller] is that juvenile brains have not developed into adult–
hood. . . . Sentencing a juvenile to prison for 51 years does not give that
juvenile an opportunity to demonstrate meaningful rehabilitation. . . . This is
the most cruel type of punishment that we can impose, except for possibly
the death penalty.” Id.
297. In Buffer II, the concurring judge asserted that courts can calculate what
constitutes de facto life sentences by determining whether “the
defendant’s age at the earliest projected time of release exceeds an
incarcerated minor’s average life expectancy.” People v. Buffer
(Buffer II), No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435, at *11 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019)
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will be able to ensure that juveniles’ sentences do not take up such a
significant portion of their lives that they are punished in excess of their
level of culpability. Under this model, Courts only need to account for
a juvenile’s average life expectancy; ‘early’ or ‘late’ deaths should not
change the sentence. According to a National Vital Statistics Report
summarizing life expectancy based on how old a person is now, a fifteenyear-old has a further life expectancy of 64.4 years. 298 Incarceration in
the general prison population, however, reduces an individual’s life
expectancy. 299 Studies demonstrate that an incarcerated person loses
two years off their life expectancy for every year they are in prison.300
And prisoners between fifty and sixty years old have health issues that
individuals outside of prison do not experience until significantly later
in life. 301 Additionally, living in the general prison population has a
more significant effect on a juvenile’s life expectancy. 302 In People v.

(Burke, J., concurring). Judge Burke also argued that “it is possible to
arrive at a number that reasonably reflects the average life expectancy of
a minor who is incarcerated for a lengthy period of time.” Id.
298. Elizabeth Arias & Jiaquan Xu, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., United States Life Tables, 2015, at 3 (2018), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr67/nvsr67_07-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89WV-Z97V].
299. Deborah LaBelle, Michigan Life Expectancy Data for Youth Serving
Natural Life Sentences, at 1, available at Library of the U.S. Courts
of the Seventh Circuit, http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1712441.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJB3-TMPT] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019)
(“It is not disputed that life expectancy for incarcerated individuals lag
behind the general population.”); People v. Buffer (Buffer I), 75 N.E.3d
470, 481–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (summarizing several reports noting the
correlation between a person’s time spent in prison and a decrease in her
life expectancy), aff’d, No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019);
Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time Served in Prison on
Mortality: New York State, 1989-2003, 103 Am. J. Pub. Health 523, 526
(2013) (“[F]or each year served in prison, a person could expect to lose
approximately [two] years of life.”); Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens
Life Expectancy, Prison Pol’y Initiative (June 26, 2017), https://www.
prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy/ [https://perma.cc/
ZG6R-P4RH] (noting that mass incarceration has decreased average
American’s life expectancy by five years).
300. Patterson, supra note 299; see also Widra, supra note 299.
301. Maurice Chammah, Do You Age Faster in Prison?, The Marshall
Project: Justice Lab (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2015/08/24/do-you-age-faster-in-prison [https://perma.cc/7CAXZDJC].
302. LaBelle, supra note 299, at 2 (asserting that the average life expectancy
for incarcerated individuals “drop[s] even lower for those who begin their
natural life sentences as children, therefore, serving longer years in prison
then [sic] adults with the same sentence”).
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Buffer, 303 the court noted that the estimated sixty-four-year life
expectancy assigned to adult offenders “probably overstates the average
life expectancy for minors committed to prison for lengthy terms.”304
Juveniles in prison are often exposed to stress and violence that have a
negative impact on their life expectancy. 305 Therefore, for juveniles,
term-of-year sentences “of no more than a few decades may actually
result in life in prison.” 306 Upon release from prison, a juvenile may have
health issues relating to their age and resulting from years in the general
prison population, issues that may eliminate any opportunity for a
meaningful life outside prison. 307 Consequently, a standard for calcul–
ating juveniles’ sentences for felony murder must account for juveniles’
prison-related diminished life expectancies, limiting the maximum
sentence that a juvenile can receive to an amount of time that still
allows for enough time after she is released to demonstrate her
rehabilitated character. 308
That standard should distinguish between sentences for juveniles
who had a direct hand in the felony’s resulting death and sentences for
juveniles who were mere accomplices. This will ensure that sentences
are not disproportionate to the crime by sentencing juveniles in
accordance with their individual culpability. A sentencing standard
that ensures juveniles will be released and afforded an opportunity to
demonstrate their rehabilitation might require that a fifteen-year
maximum sentence for a juvenile who was only an accomplice. This
303. (Buffer I), 75 N.E.3d 470 (Ill. App. Ct. Dist. 2017), aff’d, No. 122327,
2019 WL 1721435 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019).
304. Id. at 481; People v. Buffer (Buffer II), No. 122327, 2019 WL 1721435, at
*11 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019) (Burke, J., concurring) (“The accuracy of the 64year life expectancy figure with regard to minors is suspect, particularly
when one takes into account that it is generally recognized that the life
expectancy of a minor sentenced to a lengthy prison term is further
diminished.”).
305. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text; see also Straley, supra
note 161, at 986 (“The unpleasant realities of prison life reduce the life
expectancies of many prisoners incarcerated as children.”); LaBelle, supra
note 299 (“It is generally accepted that life in prison, with its stressors,
violence and disease in and of itself significantly shortens one’s life
expectancy.”).
306. Straley, supra note 161, at 986–87.
307. Id. at 987 (“[E]ven if a prisoner survives long enough to see release after
a long determinate sentence, parole may be effectively meaningless because
of the prisoner’s age and related disabilities and limitations.”).
308. An attorney who advocates for juvenile offenders sentenced to lengthy
prison terms argues that “[e]ven if juvenile offenders survive to see
freedom in their 60s . . ., they will almost certainly be hobbled by old age
and health problems, not to mention a criminal record that would make
getting housing and jobs a struggle.” Wadhwani & Tamburin, supra note
67.
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would guarantee that a juvenile would be released from prison before
age thirty-five, giving them a significant amount of time left to live
outside of prison. On the other hand, juveniles who “pulled the trigger”
should receive a greater sentence, perhaps twenty to twenty-five years.
This would prevent the offender from remaining in prison beyond age
forty-five. Even if the juvenile’s life expectancy is reduced to sixty-four
(based on the average prisoner’s life expectancy), she will still have an
appreciable period of time to live outside prison. Because the proposed
sentencing structure would both limit the sentence a juvenile may
receive under the felony murder rule and adequately account for the
juvenile’s fundamental differentness and youthfulness, dividing juve–
niles into the above culpability categories will result in proportionate
sentencing.
Courts should consider other mitigating factors in addition to age
and youthfulness, such as past criminal history and the level of
involvement in the underlying felony, to limit punishment below these
maximum sentences to ensure that sentences are proportionate and
appropriate. In addition to applying to juvenile offenders who commit
and are charged with felony murder-type offenses, this standard would
also apply to resentencing juveniles who committed felony murder-type
crimes and to individuals who committed a crime as a juvenile but were
not charged or convicted until after they reached the age of majority.
This will ensure that an offender’s sentence will account for their
reduced culpability for a felony resulting in a death that they
committed as a juvenile.

Conclusion
Juveniles are fundamentally different from adults. The application
of the felony murder rule to juveniles is necessarily at odds at with both
the rule’s purpose and the goal of effective punishment. Juveniles are
not capable of meaningfully accounting for the possibility that someone
might die during their commission of a felony. Therefore, the
transferred intent on which the felony murder doctrine relies does not
work for juveniles who could not engage in the reasoned decisionmaking that the doctrine presumes. Even if state legislation does not
yet support a Supreme Court decision that the national standards of
decency have sufficiently evolved to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s
requirement, the Court’s past reasoning and states’ current practices
still support the conclusion that applying the felony murder rule to
juveniles, without accounting for their diminished culpability, const–
itutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because juveniles are incapable
of realizing that death is a foreseeable consequence–of committing a
felony, juveniles should receive specialized treatment under the felony
murder rule that prevents them from serving a significant portion of
their lives in prison for an act for which they have limited culpability.
Accordingly, a specialized sentencing standard excluding juveniles from
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adult sentencing under the felony murder rule, and limiting sentencing
based on life expectancy, is necessary to prevent excessive and
disproportionate sentencing.
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